As political activities gather momentum ahead of the 2027 general elections, the security of Nigeria’s waterways presents a critical but often overlooked dimension of electoral preparedness. From preventing the movement of armed political groups to protecting voters, INEC personnel and election materials in remote riverine communities, the Marine Police face a responsibility that extends far beyond conventional maritime law enforcement.
The credibility of Nigeria’s 2027 general elections will depend not only on what happens at polling stations but also on the security of the routes through which voters, electoral officials and election materials must travel to get there.

For millions of Nigerians living in coastal and riverine communities, those routes are waterways.
This makes maritime security an indispensable component of electoral security, particularly in Rivers, Bayelsa, Akwa Ibom and other states where creeks, rivers, estuaries and coastal channels connect communities to political and administrative centres.
The directive by the Commissioner of Police in charge of Marine Police, Adepegba Adetoye, for officers to maintain professional, civil and strictly apolitical conduct ahead of the 2027 elections is therefore significant.
Adetoye, who issued the directive on Saturday, November 7, 2026, during an operational assessment and familiarisation tour of Marine Police formations in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, also directed commanders to intensify raids on identified criminal hotspots, enforce maritime laws and strengthen collaboration with relevant security and maritime institutions.
His engagement with Marine Police commanders from Rivers, Akwa Ibom and Bayelsa, as well as personnel attached to the Onne and Calabar seaports, provides an opportunity to examine a fundamental question: Are Nigeria’s waterways adequately prepared to withstand the security pressures that may accompany the 2027 electoral process?
The question deserves urgent attention.
The Waterways: An Overlooked Electoral Security Frontier
Nigeria’s electoral security architecture must account for the country’s peculiar geographical realities. While security preparations often concentrate on highways, urban centres, political gatherings and polling stations, the maritime environment presents a different set of operational challenges.

In riverine constituencies, waterways serve as roads. They facilitate political campaigns, voter mobilisation, commercial transportation and access to polling locations. They also provide connections between settlements that may otherwise be difficult to reach by land.
This geographical reality creates security vulnerabilities that could be exploited by criminal elements or individuals seeking to undermine the electoral process.
Poorly monitored creeks, secluded landing points and remote waterways could potentially be exploited to transport weapons, move armed groups, intimidate communities, disrupt electoral logistics or evade security operations. These are risks that require preventive assessment, intelligence gathering and sustained surveillance before the election period.
The implication is clear: electoral security planning that neglects the maritime environment leaves an important part of the national security equation inadequately addressed.
Preventing The Use of Waterways for Political Violence
One of the most important responsibilities of the Marine Police ahead of 2027 is to prevent the exploitation of waterways for the transportation of political thugs, illegal weapons and other instruments of electoral violence.

The extensive creek networks of the Niger Delta present particular challenges. Their numerous channels, remote settlements and unofficial landing points make comprehensive surveillance difficult without specialised maritime capacity.
Political violence does not necessarily originate at polling stations. Groups seeking to intimidate voters or disrupt elections may operate long before voting begins, using transportation routes and locations outside conventional security coverage.
The Marine Police must therefore develop intelligence-led patrol strategies around identified vulnerable corridors, monitor suspicious maritime movements and respond promptly to credible security reports.
This must, however, be conducted within the law. Legitimate boat operators, fishermen, traders and passengers must not be subjected to indiscriminate harassment or politically motivated profiling. The objective is to deny criminal elements opportunities to exploit the waterways, not to criminalise ordinary maritime activities.
Protecting The Voter’s Right to Participate
An important but frequently overlooked dimension of riverine electoral security is the possibility of voter suppression through the disruption of transportation.
In communities where boats provide the principal means of movement, intimidation of boat operators, attacks on passenger vessels, threats against residents or the obstruction of landing points could prevent eligible voters from reaching polling stations. Such disruptions could affect electoral participation even without an attack on a polling location.

The Marine Police must consequently consider the protection of passenger routes and community access points an essential part of their election-security responsibilities. Voters must be able to travel freely, irrespective of their political affiliations, ethnic identities or preferred candidates.
The responsibility of the security agencies is to protect that freedom, not to determine or influence how citizens exercise it.
INEC Logistics and Security of Electoral Materials
The movement of INEC personnel and election materials presents another compelling reason for increased maritime surveillance. Electoral officials must reach designated polling locations, particularly in remote riverine settlements where access by road is limited or non-existent.
Sensitive election materials must also be transported, protected and accounted for throughout the electoral process. Any security breach along these transportation corridors could delay deployment, disrupt voting or compromise the safe movement of electoral materials.

Nigeria has an operational precedent. During the November 2024 Ondo governorship election, the Nigerian Navy deployed gunboats to protect electoral personnel, voters and election materials travelling through riverine areas.
That experience underscores the importance of incorporating maritime security into election planning.
For 2027, the Marine Police, Nigerian Navy and other relevant institutions should establish coordinated arrangements for securing vulnerable electoral transportation corridors, providing escorts where necessary and responding to emergencies.
These arrangements should be developed with INEC and the Inter-Agency Consultative Committee on Election Security.
Criminal Networks and The Creeks: A Pre-Election Security Concern
The Commissioner’s directive to intensify raids on identified criminal hotspots is particularly relevant. Electoral violence does not exist in isolation from the wider security environment. Networks involved in piracy, kidnapping, cult-related violence, illegal arms trafficking and other criminal activities may create security conditions that political actors or other individuals could seek to exploit.
The existence of such criminal networks does not establish political involvement. Nevertheless, their operational capabilities and access to waterways make them relevant to election-security risk assessments.
The Marine Police must therefore prioritise the identification and disruption of criminal infrastructure before the election period. This requires sustained intelligence operations, coordinated patrols, targeted enforcement and effective cooperation with other security agencies.
Waiting until electoral violence occurs before intensifying maritime operations would undermine the preventive purpose of policing.
Political Neutrality: The Most Important Test of Professionalism
Beyond operational readiness, Adetoye’s insistence on political neutrality deserves particular attention. The presence of security personnel does not automatically guarantee electoral security. Their conduct, impartiality and accountability are equally important.
In politically competitive riverine constituencies, allegations of selective enforcement, partisan protection, intimidation of opposition supporters or harassment of particular communities can undermine public confidence in the electoral process.
Marine Police officers must not become instruments of political mobilisation, intimidation or electoral advantage. Their responsibility is to enforce the law impartially, protect citizens and electoral institutions, and respond to security threats without political considerations.

Commanders must ensure that personnel understand the distinction between legitimate security operations and actions that could compromise the constitutional rights of citizens. There must also be clear mechanisms for reporting and investigating misconduct.
Political neutrality should not remain a declaration at command meetings. It must be demonstrated through the conduct of officers on the waterways and in the communities they serve.
Inter-Agency Cooperation: No Single Institution Can Secure the Waterways Alone
The Commissioner’s familiarisation visit to NIMASA’s Eastern Zonal Office in Port Harcourt is an important element of the broader security conversation. Nigeria’s maritime environment requires coordinated action among institutions with complementary responsibilities.
The Marine Police, Nigerian Navy, NIMASA, Nigerian Ports Authority, relevant intelligence agencies and other authorised security institutions must work within clearly defined operational responsibilities.
The Marine Police brings its law-enforcement mandate to maritime policing. The Navy provides maritime defence and security capabilities, while NIMASA contributes its maritime safety, regulatory and security-related responsibilities.
The effectiveness of these institutions will depend substantially on intelligence sharing, operational coordination, communication and the ability to respond collectively to emerging threats. Their collaboration must also extend to INEC through ICCES, ensuring that maritime security considerations are incorporated into the wider national election-security plan.
Rivers, Bayelsa and Akwa Ibom: The Need for Location-Specific Preparedness
The participation of Marine Police commanders from Rivers, Bayelsa and Akwa Ibom in the Port Harcourt engagement is particularly relevant. These states contain extensive riverine and coastal settlements where the security of waterways directly affects mobility, economic activities and access to public services.
In Rivers State, for example, Bonny, Andoni, Opobo/Nkoro, Okrika, Degema and Asari-Toru have geographical and transportation realities that require specialised security planning. Bonny Island illustrates the challenge particularly well. Its connections with other parts of Rivers State depend substantially on maritime transportation.
Consequently, the security of its waterways has implications for the movement of residents, political stakeholders, electoral personnel and election materials. The same considerations apply to several communities across Bayelsa and Akwa Ibom.
A generic deployment strategy will not adequately address these differences. Each state requires a maritime electoral-security assessment identifying vulnerable routes, remote polling locations, landing points, transportation dependencies and prevailing security threats.
What The Marine Police Must Do Before January 16, 2027
With the presidential and National Assembly elections scheduled for January 16, 2027, and governorship and State House of Assembly elections scheduled for February 6, 2027, the time for translating policy directives into operational preparedness is now.
The Marine Police should prioritise the following:
- Map vulnerable waterways: Identify critical maritime corridors, remote settlements, unofficial landing points and waterways connecting communities to polling locations.
- Strengthen intelligence-led patrols: Intensify surveillance around identified criminal hotspots and vulnerable maritime routes, with particular attention to suspicious movements and illegal arms transportation.
- Protect electoral logistics: Establish coordinated arrangements for the safe movement of INEC personnel and election materials in riverine constituencies.
- Conduct joint security exercises: Bring together the Marine Police, Nigerian Navy and other relevant agencies to test operational coordination, communication and emergency response.
- Train personnel: Strengthen officers’ understanding of electoral laws, human rights, rules of engagement, conflict de-escalation and political neutrality.
- Establish community intelligence networks: Engage traditional rulers, community development committees, boat operators, fishing associations and other legitimate stakeholders in early-warning arrangements.
- Strengthen accountability: Establish clear reporting and investigation procedures for allegations of misconduct, partisan interference and abuse of authority.
- Maintain post-election surveillance: Sustain appropriate maritime security operations throughout the collation, declaration of results and post-election period.
These interventions should be guided by credible intelligence, respect for civil liberties and clearly defined institutional responsibilities.
The Danger of Security Operations Without Public Trust
In strengthening maritime security, the authorities must avoid creating an environment in which ordinary residents become victims of excessive enforcement.
For riverine communities, waterways are not merely security corridors. They are lifelines connecting households, schools, markets, healthcare facilities and places of employment.

Indiscriminate searches, arbitrary arrests, harassment of boat operators and excessive restrictions on passenger movement could disrupt livelihoods and alienate the very communities whose cooperation is necessary for effective policing.
The Commissioner’s emphasis on civil conduct and respect for the rights of the public must therefore guide operational deployment.
Effective maritime policing requires a balance between security enforcement and the protection of legitimate economic and social activities. Public trust is not an optional component of security. It is an important source of intelligence, cooperation and operational legitimacy.
The Security Responsibility Does Not End on Election Day
Another important consideration is the post-election environment. Electoral disputes, protests, contested results and political tensions can generate security challenges after voting has concluded.
The Marine Police must therefore maintain operational readiness beyond election day, particularly in communities where waterways could be exploited for retaliatory attacks, the movement of armed groups or the disruption of commercial transportation.

Protecting vulnerable communities, preventing reprisals and safeguarding maritime infrastructure must remain priorities throughout the electoral cycle. The ultimate objective should be to ensure that the elections do not aggravate existing security challenges or create new threats to the stability of riverine communities.
Conclusion: The Creeks Must Not Become Corridors of Electoral Violence
CP Adepegba Adetoye’s directive presents an opportunity to elevate maritime security within Nigeria’s preparations for the 2027 general elections. However, the effectiveness of the directive will ultimately be determined by what happens beyond command meetings and official pronouncements.
Nigeria needs a Marine Police service that is operationally prepared, intelligence-driven, professionally disciplined and politically neutral. The Nigerian Navy and other relevant institutions must complement its efforts through coordinated maritime security operations.
For riverine communities, the test of electoral preparedness is straightforward: Can voters travel safely to exercise their franchise? Can INEC officials reach remote polling locations without intimidation? Can election materials move securely through waterways? Can communities participate without fear of armed groups or partisan security interference?
These are fundamental questions that must be addressed before the elections. The creeks must not become corridors of electoral violence. The waterways must not become safe havens for political thuggery, illegal arms or criminal networks. And the security agencies entrusted with protecting the electoral process must never become instruments of partisan interests.
The credibility of the 2027 elections must extend beyond the highways and polling stations to the creeks, rivers, estuaries and coastal communities that form an essential part of Nigeria’s democratic landscape.
For millions of Nigerians in these communities, securing the waterways is not simply a maritime security responsibility. It is about protecting their right to vote, their freedom of movement and their place in the democratic process.
An election is not fully secured if the people cannot safely reach the ballot.

